Issue 7 Q3 2026
FEATURING
Competing sanctionsregimes: A new era ofcross-border compliance risk
Omar Khattab Partner, Clyde & Co
Introduction I am pleased to introduce the seventh edition of Risk Quarterly, our global publication focused on the strategic risks shaping organisations in an increasingly complex regulatory and enforcement environment. This edition explores how geopolitical change, regulatory divergence, technological disruption and increasing cross-border enforcement are reshaping the regulatory risk environment for global businesses. As authorities strengthen oversight, expand enforcement tools and cooperate more closely across jurisdictions, organisations are having to navigate not only a growing volume of regulation, but also differences between regimes that can create conflicting obligations and difficult commercial decisions.
At the heart of this issue is the challenge of operating across borders when regulatory approaches do not always align. Our lead article examines the evolving global sanctions landscape, looking at developments across the US, UK, EU and China and the practical challenges created when compliance with one regime may increase exposure under another. We consider what this means for business decision-making, operational structures and board-level oversight, and why sanctions risk increasingly needs to be considered as an enterprise-wide strategic issue. Elsewhere in the issue, we explore the wider enforcement landscape, including financial crime, whistleblowing, AI and emerging technologies, as well as the growing expectations around governance, accountability and organisational preparedness. We also consider how regulatory developments are influencing supply chains, third-party risk and operational decision-making across different markets. Insights from our latest Corporate Risk Radar provide further context on these challenges, highlighting how regulatory and reputational risk, governance and cross-border complexity are becoming increasingly interconnected, whilst our latest Emerging Risk insights explore global sanctions trends, risks and implications for insurers. Across these topics, one point stands out: regulatory risk can no longer be viewed solely through the lens of legal compliance. Decisions taken in one jurisdiction can have operational, financial and reputational consequences elsewhere, while geopolitics, technology and changing enforcement priorities are making the regulatory environment harder to predict. For boards and senior leaders, this places greater importance on horizon scanning, clear escalation pathways, effective governance and a joined-up understanding of regulatory exposure across the organisation. We hope you find this edition useful and thought-provoking. Thank you to all our contributors. If there are topics you would like to see explored in future issues, please contact us at riskquarterly@clydeco.com.
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Competing sanctions regimes:
The reality is that conflicting sanctions and blocking regimes can create pressure for greater separation of operations within multinationals.
Working towards closer inter-agency cooperation
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Energy Institute. (2025, June). Statistical Review of World Energy 2025. Energy Institute.https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review Cavina, T., Moavero Milanesi, L., Samandari, H., Tai, H., & Winter, R. (2023, August 8). Five Key Action Areas to Put Europe’s Energy Transition on a More Orderly Path. McKinsey & Company.https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/five-key-action-areas-to-put-europes-energy-transition-on-a-more-orderly-path Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2018, October 8). Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special Report. IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ Net Zero Tracker. (2025, September 22). Net Zero Stocktake 2025: Assessing the Status and Trends of Net Zero Target Setting. Net Zero Tracker.https://zerotracker.net/analysis/net-zero-stocktake-2025
MEET THE AUTHORS
Anousheh Bromfield Partner,London
A new era of cross-border compliance risk
For global organisations, regulatory risk is no longer simply a narrow compliance concern: it’s a strategic business issue. Decisions in one market can now have financial, operational and reputational consequences elsewhere in the world. Navigating international sanctions is a case in point.
Amid ongoing geopolitical tensions, the pressure on multinational companies to comply with diverse – and sometimes conflicting – sanctions regimes around the world is intensifying. A patchwork of rules is imposed by individual countries or trading blocs, and even agencies within the same jurisdiction can take different approaches to enforcement. Meanwhile, some countries impacted by sanctions are implementing their own counter-measures.
Strategy
As some authorities move towards closer cooperation, others are taking a counter-approach. Managing exposure therefore requires a coordinated business-wide strategy.
Recognising the difficulties inherent in maintaining compliance across multiple regimes, some authorities are taking steps to help businesses better understand their obligations. Notably, the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) and the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) are working in partnership to deliver joint guidance on UK and US sanctions regimes. In June 2026 they issued a detailed overview of their respective roles and outlined some of the similarities and differences in their enforcement procedures, violation assessment frameworks, liability standards and voluntary disclosure policies.
AI is often described as a “force multiplier”3 – meaning that early adopters can make progress faster and faster as AI augments their capabilities, leaving the rest falling further behind. This applies to every industry, not just ‘high-tech’ sectors. For example:
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However, these are not the only bodies in either the UK or the US with sanctions compliance oversight responsibilities and enforcement powers. For example, the joint OFAC/OFSI guidance does not currently include the role and focus of the UK’s Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (OTSI), which polices trade activities, despite its wide remit.
In the US, other federal agencies that have responsibility for sanctions enforcement include the Department of Justice (DOJ), and more than one agency can take action on the same offences in parallel. Although there is significant inter-agency cooperation across criminal, civil and administrative enforcement, with agencies issuing several joint compliance notes in recent years, their policies and approaches can differ.
Different, yet coordinated, approaches
Such counter-measures are not new. The European Union has for several years had a blocking statute in place designed to limit the extra-territorial application of third country sanctions (essentially those emanating from the US) on companies with operations in the EU. The expectation is that entities operating in the EU should comply first and foremost with EU law.
This could trigger civil claims or administrative penalties which could put at risk the entity’s ability to tender for government contracts, import and export goods or deliver services, as well as restricting the movement of vital data and personnel across borders. The law is being robustly enforced by the Chinese courts, which are prepared to assert jurisdiction over these disputes even where contracts contain explicit foreign governing law clauses.
The reality is that conflicting sanctions and blocking regimes can create pressure for greater separation of operations within multinationals. However, managing sanctions risk jurisdiction by jurisdiction is increasingly difficult, making coordinated oversight more important than ever. Multinationals may want to revisit their internal compliance systems to ensure frameworks are both robust and dynamic enough to maintain appropriate controls while being capable of adapting to changes in the global landscape quickly.
There may be reasons to enhance counterparty screening, sanctions monitoring and record-keeping, adjust contract language, and put in place horizon scanning. Risk assessments that map exposure across jurisdictions and take into account both where there are subtle nuances and clear divergence in regulatory requirements and attitudes to enforcement could prove invaluable.
Sanctions risk now has a significant bearing on corporate decision-making at the highest levels. Companies may benefit from undertaking a risk-based analysis of questions such as whether to stop doing business with an entity altogether or whether blocking payment is sufficient, or which competing sanctions regime poses the biggest non-compliance risk to the business.
Boards and senior leaders should address sanctions risk as a strategic governance issue. That includes defining (and regularly refining) the organisation’s risk tolerance, determining which decisions require board or executive approval, and making sure they receive the information they need in a timely manner. Careful thought may need to be given as to how impacts will be weighed across jurisdictions, how the business will respond when compliance with one regime creates exposure under another, and what evidence supports those decisions.
Eliminating the conflict caused by competing regulations may be impossible, so identifying potential problems early and managing them carefully is vital. When rules are fragmented, cooperation is inconsistent and pushback is growing, multinationals would do well to treat sanctions as an enterprise-wide issue requiring coordinated legal, compliance, operational and strategic oversight across borders, rather than as a purely country-specific concern. That approach will help them anticipate and adapt to diverse and opposing risks before they crystallise into commercial, legal or reputational damage.
As a result, businesses face increased complexity, and a real risk that compliance with one regime could result in a violation in another. Managing this conflict when operating across borders is an evolving challenge.
This was a coordinated resolution, with the DOJ taking into account the heavy fines imposed by BIS in its decision not to prosecute, while BIS recognised that the DOJ had required the company to forfeit millions of dollars in profits from the alleged violations when considering its (reduced) penalty. However, each agency took its own approach to enforcement, resulting in two different (albeit interlinked) outcomes. Although in this case the issue concerned export controls, a similar situation is possible with sanctions.
In one recent example relating to export controls, the DOJ declined to prosecute a company that had voluntarily disclosed misconduct, fully cooperated with enforcement agencies and remediated the issues in a timely manner. At the same time, the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) fined the company for the same conduct in a civil action after applying its own administrative enforcement guidance.
Anti-sanctions counter-measures escalate
Cooperation and coordination may deepen among regimes with broadly aligned objectives and rules. At the same time however, some countries targeted or affected by sanctions are responding with counter-measures of their own. For example, earlier this year, China accelerated its anti-foreign sanctions enforcement regime, which is intended to block or penalise foreign entities whose primary or secondary sanctions compliance requirements harm Chinese business interests.
Chinese blocking moves create a dilemma
This puts many multinationals in a serious predicament. US sanctions laws in particular often have extra-territorial application that may require them to terminate contracts with, or refuse to provide goods and services or stop payments to, affected entities in China. However, doing so could expose them or their subsidiaries to liability under Chinese law, which treats such actions as implementing or assisting a foreign discriminatory restrictive measure, and itself has extra-territorial application.
Like their Chinese counterparts, EU courts are strict on upholding the blocking statute in civil proceedings. As a result, there is a high risk of liability being upheld in any civil claim for actions that are detrimental to the contracting partner and constitute violations of EU law.
Unlike in China however, the EU provides for some significant exceptions. Where multinationals have EU operations that are expected to comply with US sanctions, the rules allow companies to apply for a licence to allow them to take whatever actions are necessary to do so. Additionally, case law makes clear that companies can take steps such as terminating a relationship with or refusing payment to an entity that falls within a third country sanctions regime – provided they can prove that decision was taken for legitimate business reasons and not solely to comply with those sanctions.
Meanwhile, the EU continues to expand its own sanctions regime. While it does not go so far as to impose extra-territorial sanctions on third countries in the same way as the US does, its focus on clamping down on the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia in third countries will inevitably increase risk for multinationals. Understanding the extent to which sanctions regimes apply beyond jurisdictional borders is becoming more complex than ever.
Where sanctions are concerned, risk is multi-directional. Even where regimes are essentially pulling the same way, and despite improved cooperation between authorities, multinational companies should stay alert for critical differences in rules and regulatory approach. At the same time, there is a fine line to walk if they are to comply with regimes that fundamentally contradict one another.
So how can organisations continue to operate globally when political priorities and regulatory approaches increasingly differ between markets?
Implementing robust operational and legal controls
How organisations can manage competing forces
At the same time, planning ahead for longer-term ways to mitigate sanctions risk, such as forging new business relationships in unaffected locations or applying in advance for any licences required for compliant operations to continue, may be worthwhile. Companies could also consider where lessons learnt in one jurisdiction provide helpful insight in another with similar rules, and think about how these learnings should be shared and embedded as appropriate. Establishing contact with the relevant national authorities can also be a helpful way to identify solutions early.
Rethinking compliance frameworks
Sanctions risk now has a significant bearing on corporate decision-making at the highest levels.
When rules are fragmented, cooperation is inconsistent and pushback is growing, multinationals would do well to treat sanctions as an enterprise-wide issue.
It’s vital that clear accountability exists across legal, compliance, finance, procurement, operations and regional management, that local teams know how and when to escalate issues, and that contingency plans are in place if banking access, supply chains, data flows, personnel movement or market participation are disrupted.
Strengthening decision-making and strategic governance
Chester Chin Associate,Singapore
Kenna Clarke Senior Associate, London
Jeffrey W. Cottle Partner, Washington, DC
Sophia Henrich Counsel,Munich
Nicholas Lum Partner, Singapore
Yolanda McCarthy Senior Associate, London
Patrick Murphy Partner, London
Jessica Rodgers Counsel, Washington, DC
Matt Schmitt Associate, Washington, DC
Weiyi Tan Partner, Singapore
Flora Tang Legal Director, Beijing
Michelle Tay Senior Associate, Singapore
Lisa Weigand Associate, London
Zihao Zhu Associate,Shanghai
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An investigation may begin with a whistleblower disclosure, unusual payment, cyber incident or concern about a public statement. Its scope can expand rapidly. Suspected bribery may expose sanctions or money laundering risks. A ransomware incident may trigger sanctions, suspicious matter reporting obligations, privacy, critical infrastructure, criminal law and insurance notification issues. A review of sustainability claims may reveal deficiencies in data governance, financial reporting, board oversight and supply chain due diligence.
A defensible investigation requires a clear scope, independent decision-makers, document preservation, structured interviews and effective governance over findings and remediation. It should identify the legal basis for collecting and disclosing information, address legal professional privilege from the outset and distinguish established facts from allegations and unresolved issues. Multinational organisations must reconcile these requirements across applicable jurisdictions.
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is Australia’s corporate, markets, financial services and consumer credit regulator and its recent enforcement record reflects this shift. In the second half of 2025, ASIC secured nearly $350 million in court-ordered civil penalties, including $250 million against ANZ for widespread misconduct and systemic risk failures. ASIC also reported that it had doubled investigations over five years and increased civil enforcement proceedings by 20 per cent.1
The risk is not simply a failure to investigate. An investigation that lacks independence, rigour or procedural fairness may compound the original problem. It can compromise evidence, expose a whistleblower’s identity, generate employment claims, prejudice regulatory engagement and deprive the board of an accurate understanding of events.
Australian Parliamentary scrutiny of KPMG Australia illustrates how the handling of a whistleblower disclosure and the adequacy of an investigation can become issues in their own right. KPMG publicly acknowledged that its treatment of a whistleblower and its investigation of the allegations fell short of the expectations of the firm, the whistleblower and the broader community. It also acknowledged that its initial internal investigation had not been conducted with the necessary rigour.2
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services has received evidence and documents concerning the matter. The Committee’s published materials include correspondence about the KPMG whistleblower matter and responses concerning legal professional privilege from KPMG, its legal advisers and the Clerk of the Senate.3 The matter has also prompted broader scrutiny of complaints involving major audit firms. That scrutiny does not establish misconduct in any individual case. It does, however, demonstrate how an internal disclosure can develop into a wider examination of governance, professional standards and whistleblower arrangements.
Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) establishes the corporate whistleblower protection regime, including protections around eligible disclosures, confidentiality, detriment and access to remedies. It also requires specified entities to maintain a compliant whistleblower policy.4
egulatory risk is no longer confined to individual statutes, regulators or jurisdictions. For Australian corporates, particularly those operating
internationally, a single incident can engage anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, sanctions, privacy, cyber security, consumer protection, sustainability disclosure and directors’ duties simultaneously. The resulting investigation may involve multiple regulators, parallel civil and criminal exposure, and the cross-border exchange of information.
R
The new compliance reality for Australian corporates
Regulatory convergence:
This convergence is reshaping compliance. Regulators increasingly assess whether governance frameworks, systems and controls operate effectively in practice, rather than whether required policies merely exist. They are also more willing to pursue directors, senior executives, trustees and other gatekeepers where systemic failures reveal inadequate oversight or a weak compliance culture. For organisations operating across multiple markets, the practical challenge is that these obligations increasingly overlap, requiring a coordinated rather than siloed response.
Investigations as the point of convergence
Whistleblower investigations under the Corporations Act
ASIC’s proceedings concerning the First Guardian Master Fund provide another example. ASIC commenced civil penalty proceedings against Equity Trustees Superannuation Ltd, alleging deficient due diligence in onboarding First Guardian investment options. The alleged contraventions include ss 52 and 54B of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) and s 912A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Those allegations remain to be determined.7
These provisions affect investigation design. An organisation must first determine whether a communication may constitute a protected disclosure before treating it as an ordinary workplace grievance. It must restrict access to identifying information, separate investigative responsibilities from implicated management, monitor potential detriment and record the basis for decisions affecting the whistleblower. A deficient investigation may therefore create separate statutory exposure, regardless of whether the underlying allegation is substantiated.
ASIC’s 2026 enforcement priorities combine consumer protection with continuing concerns about market integrity, systemic compliance failures, corporate governance and directors’ duties. Areas of focus include misleading pricing practices, misconduct in private credit, financial reporting failures, insurance claims and complaint handling, superannuation member services, insider trading and auditor misconduct.5
The Federal Court’s decision in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mercer Superannuation (Australia) Ltd demonstrates the focus on systems and regulatory reporting. Mercer admitted contraventions involving failures to report reportable situations within time or at all, inadequate systems for identifying and tracking reportable investigations, and failures to take reasonable steps to prevent false or misleading statements in reports lodged with ASIC. The Court imposed pecuniary penalties totalling $10.3 million.6
AUSTRAC’s proceedings against Entain Group Pty Ltd allege serious and systemic non-compliance with Australia’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws. Those allegations remain before the Federal Court.10 In May 2026, the Federal Court imposed civil penalties of $50,000 and $45,000 against Castra Licensee Pty Ltd and Princeton Securities (NSW) Pty Ltd, respectively. The proceedings followed the companies’ failures to pay infringement notices concerning mandatory reporting obligations.11
The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) regulates compliance with Australia’s AML/CTF regime and acts as the country’s financial intelligence unit. Its enforcement toolkit includes civil penalties, enforceable undertakings, infringement notices, remedial directions and significant information-gathering powers.9
Australia’s Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/Counter-Terrorism Financing (CTF) framework requires regulated entities to maintain risk-based programmes, undertake customer due diligence and ongoing monitoring, meet reporting obligations and establish appropriate governance and compliance responsibilities.8
These matters demonstrate that liability can arise from the systems used to identify, investigate and report suspected contraventions, not merely from the underlying conduct. Taken together, these examples show how failures in governance and reporting can create exposure across overlapping regulatory obligations.
ASIC’s enforcement focus
AUSTRAC moves from policy to operational effectiveness
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) supervises banks, insurers and most superannuation entities. Its enforcement and supervisory toolkit extends beyond litigation to include directions, licence conditions, court-enforceable undertakings, capital requirements, thematic reviews and heightened reporting or engagement.
In December 2025, APRA accepted a court-enforceable undertaking from Netwealth Superannuation Services Pty Ltd under s 262A of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth). The undertaking followed APRA’s concerns about Netwealth’s investment governance framework and its processes for onboarding and monitoring investment options.13
APRA’S FOCUS ON GOVERNANCE AND RISK CULTURE
In April 2025, APRA accepted a court-enforceable undertaking from ANZ addressing continuingweaknesses in non-financial risk management and risk culture. APRA also increased ANZ’s operational risk capital add-on from $750 million to $1 billion.12
These interventions demonstrate that governance deficiencies may lead to independent reviews, extensive remediation and additional capital requirements without conventional civil penalty proceedings.
Australia’s sanctions framework is governed principally by the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (Cth), the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (Cth) and the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth). The regime can have extraterritorial effect and includes enforcement and information-gathering powers.14
SANCTIONS RISK EXTENDS BEYOND SCREENING
For multinational organisations, Australian sanctions obligations may operate alongside US, UK, EU and other regimes. Exposure may arise through subsidiaries, joint ventures, intermediaries, beneficial ownership structures, technology transfers, trade routes and payment chains. Effective compliance therefore requires ongoing monitoring, transaction controls, documented escalation and prompt investigation of sanctions alerts.
Regulatory convergence demands an integrated investigations and compliance model. Legal, financial crime, cyber, privacy, sustainability, risk and human resources functions must apply consistent escalation criteria and evidence standards. Boards should receive reporting that explains interconnected exposure rather than treating each regulatory regime in isolation. For multinational organisations, that model also needs to account for how the same issue may trigger different obligations, regulators and reporting expectations across jurisdictions.
THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE
The critical question is no longer whether an organisation has a policy for every risk. It is whether the organisation can demonstrate that its governance arrangements identified the issue, protected the whistleblower, preserved evidence, investigated with appropriate independence and rigour, and delivered a coordinated response across affected regulators and jurisdictions.
MEET THE AUTHOR
Rebecca Kelly Partner, Brisbane
Regulatory convergence: The new compliance reality for Australian corporates Australian Securities and Investments Commission. (2026, February). ASIC Enforcement and Regulatory Update: July to December 2025, Report No 829. Australian Securities and Investments Commission. KPMG Australia. (2026, May 29). KPMG Australia Investigation into Whistleblower Allegations. KPMG Australia. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. (2026). Additional Documents: Oversight of ASIC, the Takeovers Panel and the Corporations Legislation. Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 1317AAA, 1317AA, 1317AAB, 1317AAE. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 1317AC, 1317AD, 1317AI. Court, S. (2025, November 13). The power and purpose of enforcement. Australian Securities and Investments Commission. https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/speeches/the-power-and-purpose-of-enforcement Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mercer Superannuation (Australia) Ltd [2026] FCA 832, [1]–[8], [132]–[137]. Australian Securities and Investments Commission. (2026, May 21). ASIC sues Equity Trustees alleging First Guardian onboarding failures. Australian Securities and Investments Commission. Media Release No. 26-101MR. See also Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), ss 52, 54B; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 912A. Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth); Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules 2025 (Cth). Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), s 175. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. (2024, December 16). AUSTRAC takes Ladbrokes and Neds' operator, Entain, to Federal Court over serious non-compliance with Australia's money laundering laws. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. (2026, May 27). Federal Court imposes penalties after businesses fail to pay AUSTRAC infringement notices. Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. (2025, April 3). APRA accepts court enforceable undertaking from ANZ and increases capital add-on to $1 billion. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. (2025, December 18). Court enforceable undertaking given by Netwealth Superannuation Services Pty Ltd and accepted by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. See also Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth), s 262A. Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (Cth), ss 10–11, 16, 19–24; Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (Cth); Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth).
References
Reference list
These types of accounting, offering fraud, and insider trading cases have long been at the core of the SEC’s enforcement mission, and they are still being brought even in the current regulatory environment.
What multinational businesses need to know
Changing US enforcement priorities:
The current regulatory environment in the United States is dramatically different from anything in recent memory. Since the current administration took office in January 2025, it has significantly scaled back financial regulatory enforcement. This new approach has been positioned as a way to decrease regulatory burdens on businesses. So does that mean multinational companies with US operations can cut back on their compliance programs? Not so fast.
The federal securities laws, which are enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), create a complex framework of registration, disclosure, record-keeping, and other requirements. The SEC may bring enforcement actions for violations that occur outside of the United States if wrongful conduct took place in the US or the violation has a substantial effect on the United States.1 For that reason, multinational companies with subsidiaries or significant business dealings in the United States are well-advised to have formal policies, procedures, and oversight to ensure they remain compliant with the federal securities laws.
For fiscal years 2021 through 2024, the SEC initiated between 434 and 501 “standalone” (or new) enforcement actions per year.2 For fiscal year 2025, that number plummeted to 303.3 Even more remarkably, almost 40% of those fiscal 2025 actions were filed between October and December 2024, under the previous administration.4 In a dramatic departure from historical practice, the current Commission not only terminated many pending cases but also sharply criticized the enforcement practices of the prior Commission in the press release announcing the 2025 results.5
Another significant regulatory concern for multinational companies is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which broadly prohibits US persons from paying bribes to any foreign government official for business advantage.6 The FCPA is jointly enforced by the SEC and the US Department of Justice (DOJ). Careful review and proper documentation of all payments to foreign officials – including those working for state-owned companies – have long been essential for any entity with US operations to ensure compliance with the FCPA.
Less than a month into its term, the current administration surprisingly suspended all enforcement of the FCPA.7 Four months later, the DOJ announced FCPA enforcement would resume, but under a more restrictive set of guidelines.8
In light of these dramatic changes in enforcement approaches, companies might reasonably consider whether to scale back their programs for ensuring compliance with the US securities laws and the FCPA. But doing so would be shortsighted. For one thing, enforcement may be down, but it has not been discontinued. Just in the last two months, the SEC brought enforcement actions against a public company for recognizing over a billion dollars in fictitious revenue,9 and an auto finance company for selling $1.9 billion in asset-backed securities where the same loan receivables were pledged as collateral for multiple offerings.10 The SEC also recently charged two investment bankers with insider trading after one of them allegedly learned of an upcoming acquisition his firm was handling, and the other bought 2.2 million shares of the target’s stock ahead of the announcement.11
The SEC is also not the only game in town. Each of the fifty states in the US has its own securities laws, typically called “blue sky” laws. Portions of those “blue sky” laws are preempted by the federal securities laws, but there are notable exceptions. State securities enforcement agencies can enforce their own antifraud laws, as well as fill gaps in the federal regulatory scheme. Some state regulators may be inclined to enforce their state laws more aggressively in the present environment. For example, earlier this year the New York Attorney General brought an insider trading case under New York law against a former pharmaceutical CEO who sold millions of dollars of his company’s shares before it was disclosed that large amounts of the company’s product were contaminated and unusable.12 The SEC investigated the same conduct, but it brought charges only against the company, not the CEO.13
Christopher White Senior Counsel,Chicago
Against this backdrop, companies that do business in the United States should be wary of paring back their compliance programs. The federal securities laws and the FCPA still exist and are still being enforced through a variety of mechanisms. Moreover, a new administration could reverse course and adopt a more aggressive approach to enforcement.
The United States also has an active plaintiff’s bar that pursues private securities class actions. According to one report, securities class action filings are up 30% in the first half of 2026, with a sharp increase in filings against companies headquartered outside the United States.14
If management stops emphasizing the importance of compliance, employees start losing good risk prevention habits that took so long to develop. Whatever short-term cost savings might be achieved from cutting back on compliance can easily be dwarfed by the cost of rebuilding a compliance program in the future or the potential cost of dealing with preventable mishaps.
But perhaps most importantly, compliance is a risk management tool. The goal of a vigorous compliance program is to prevent violations in the first place through strong policies and procedures. Once a robust compliance framework is in place, employees become used to working within it, and the company is better able to avoid violations and to catch small problems before they become major crises. But building a “culture of compliance” is a long process that requires consistent commitment from every level of the organization.
The US federal securities laws are complex, and the consequences for violating them can be significant. Companies with operations in the United States would be well-advised to establish and maintain strong compliance programs for those laws, regardless of signals from the current political administration. Risk prevention programs come at a cost, but the benefit of avoiding enforcement actions in the future is priceless.
Changing US enforcement priorities: What multinational businesses need to know U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2024, November 22). SEC announces enforcement results for fiscal year 2024. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2023, November 14). SEC announces enforcement results for fiscal year 2023. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2022, November 15). SEC announces enforcement results for FY22. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2021, November 15). SEC announces enforcement results for FY 2021. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2025). SEC announces enforcement results for fiscal year 2025. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2025). SEC announces record enforcement actions brought in first quarter of fiscal year 2025. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases The White House. (2025). Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement to further American economic and national security. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov U.S. Department of Justice. (2025). Guidelines for investigations and enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). DOJ. https://www.justice.gov/ U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2026). Mordechai Haim Ferder and Simba IL Holdings LLC, Defendants; Mordechai Haim Ferder and Edit Fintzi Ferder in Their Capacities as Trustees of the Haim Family Trust, TF 2021 Irrevocable Trust, and RF 2021 Irrevocable Trust, Relief Defendants. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/ U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2026). SEC charges former executives with fraud in connection with USD 1.9 billion collapse of subprime auto lender Tricolor. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/ U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2026). Gavin Wolfe; Jason Satsky, Defendants; and Evergreen Capital L.P., Evergreen Financial LLC, Empire Property Management LLC, GAW Holdings, LLC, SA 1055 LLC, SA 1057 LLC, SA 1082 LLC, and SA 1083 LLC, Relief Defendants. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/ New York Attorney General. (2026). Attorney General James sues former CEO of Emergent BioSolutions for insider trading. Office of the New York State Attorney General. https://ag.ny.gov/ U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. (2026). Emergent BioSolutions, Inc. SEC. https://www.sec.gov/ Cornerstone Research. (2026). Securities class action filings surge in the first half of 2026. Cornerstone Research. https://www.cornerstone.com/
The evolving risk landscape through the lens of leading decision-makers
Corporate Risk Radar
Click here todownload the report
In our latest Corporate Risk Radar Report, we surveyed 700 senior decision-makers across ten sectors and eight regions worldwide to understand how they are navigating a permanently elevated risk landscape.
Risk to organisations
Economic and geopolitical risk weigh heavily
Regulatory and compliance burden now ranks as a high-impact risk for 85% of leaders, up from 54% a year ago. It sits just one percentage point behind technological and operational risk at the top of the agenda. Compliance is no longer a fixed target but a moving one: requirements across AI, data privacy, ESG reporting and sector-specific regulation are arriving quickly, and inconsistently, across jurisdictions.
Factors posing the most risk to organisations
The shift
Regulatory risk rarely surfaces as a routine compliance failure. The most serious incidents appear at the moment of a breach, and the window to respond is narrower than it looks.
Important skills when hiring next generation of general counsel
Reputational risk has followed the same path, rated high impact by 78% of leaders (up from 47%). The cost of missing a regulatory obligation reaches well beyond the financial penalty. The biggest reputational risk factors are service and quality failures that damage trust (69%), investor pressure (60%), and governance and conduct failures, including ethics (57%).
Regulation and reputation now move together
Cross-border regulatory complexity is already a significant risk factor for 51% of organisations, and ESG, data and privacy compliance burden for 64%. 82% of leaders say rising regulatory and compliance obligations are materially shaping their ability to invest in and grow the business.
Click here to download the full Clyde & Co Corporate Risk Radar report 2026
Meet the AUTHORS
Roshanak Bassiri Gharb Partner, Dubai
Regulation, reputation and the cost of getting it wrong
windows narrowing, your ability to respond quickly and effectively can determine whether an incident is contained or develops into a wider crisis.
egulatory and compliance risk has surged up the corporate agenda. With requirements multiplying and disclosure
regulatory and compliance risk tends to sit lower on the executive agenda, leaders can often feel that it is more for technical people to manage.
Here’s what they told us about regulatory and reputational risk.
14%
82%
+31
85%
of leaders now rate regulatory & compliance burden a high-impact risk, up from 54%.
of the C-suite name it as the risk needing most senior attention.
point rise in a single year, taking it to the top of the agenda.
say rising obligations are materially shaping their ability to grow.
Despite ranking near the top for impact, only 14% of C-suite executives name regulatory burden as the area that needed the most senior attention over the past year, behind operational challenges (19%), technological risk (18%) and economic risk (17%). As Roshanak Bassiri Gharb, Partner, Clyde & Co, puts it: “regulatory and compliance risk tends to sit lower on the executive agenda, leaders can often feel that it is more for technical people to manage.”
The boardroom blind spot
That delegation carries a risk of its own: in many organisations, the function governing regulatory risk operates with limited boardroom visibility.
When risk becomes reportable
Most serious regulatory breaches arise from failures to disclose. Companies face very short timeframes to disclose and act in the company’s best interests. The reputational risk is equally significant, as consequences can be immediate and played out publicly.
Rebecca Kelly, Partner, Clyde & Co
Confidence vs. readiness
87% of leaders feel prepared to manage regulatory risk, and 85% to manage reputational risk. But preparedness for routine compliance is not the same as readiness for a live breach. When regulatory management sits too far from the boardroom, accountability turns reactive rather than proactive. The organisations that contain damage most effectively are those with well-established escalation routes, clear decision-making authority, and teams that can act inside the disclosure windows regulators require.
The cross-border multiplier
The bottom line
Regulatory readiness rests on judgement and governance, not just knowledge of the rules. Boards and senior leaders should be asking whether the right escalation pathways are in place, and whether regulatory risk is surfacing often enough, and in enough depth, to enable meaningful oversight. Testing those structures before you need them is part of what effective regulatory governance looks like in practice.
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In addition, OFSI’s penalty notices helpfully provide details of the mitigating and aggravating factors which influenced its decision-making, and set out compliance learnings for other organisations. The Citi London notice was particularly detailed, and compliance teams within UK financial institutions (or non-UK firms with exposure to UK sanctions) will be expected to have read and understood its implications. As noted in the recent decisions described in this article, financial services firms are considered by OFSI to have greater sanctions exposure than other sectors, which means that they are expected to keep their training and compliance frameworks up to date. Otherwise this could lead to breaches, and in the event of a breach could result in a higher penalty; one of the aggravating factors OFSI flagged in the Bank of Scotland penalty notice was the fact that Bank of Scotland’s mandatory sanctions training was outdated. Sanctions screening and sanctions due diligence systems must consistently be updated to account for changes on the UK Sanctions List; refresher checks of existing clients should be undertaken regularly, including when there are new designations.
Even where firms could previously rely on the maximum 50% voluntary self-disclosure and co-operation discount (as Bank of Scotland did), OFSI will decrease this to a maximum discount of 30%. However, to continue to encourage firms to engage with OFSI and provide fuller disclosures, OFSI seeks to implement settlement and early account schemes12 which offer a maximum 30% and 20% discount, respectively.
It seems that OFSI is looking closely at the UK financial services sector. OFSI’s most recent annual review report8 set out that the financial services sector (along with the legal sector) was most affected by enforcement action in 2024-2025. This seems to be in line with the UK’s wider policy focus to tackle financial crime by targeting professional enablers rather than directly targeting the non-compliant actors themselves to prevent circumvention of financial crime and sanctions regulations. The UK’s Anti-Corruption Strategy 20259 (2025 AC Strategy) emphasises this point, with a recent policy paper on the AC Strategy 2025 stating that the UK is strengthening enforcement action against corruption by scaling up its capability to pursue professional enablers.
Other recent enforcement notices include a public disclosure notice (but no monetary penalty) issued to Vanquis Bank Limited (Vanquis) for breaches of counter-terrorism sanctions in September last year;3 a £160,000 penalty against Bank of Scotland Plc (Bank of Scotland) for infringing the UK–Russia sanctions, announced in January 2026;4 and a penalty of £165,000 imposed against Deutsche Bank AG London Branch (Deutsche Bank) in April this year for breaching UK–Russia sanctions legislation.5
In the event of a UK financial sanctions breach, OFSI will take into consideration mitigating and aggravating factors when deciding whether to issue a monetary penalty, and the value of such a penalty. Examples of factors are set out in OFSI’s Financial sanctions enforcement and monetary penalties guidance.
Looking ahead
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Catríona Campbell Consultant, London
Systems and controls failures are often highlighted in OFSI decisions. Most banks use third-party automated screening tools to screen parties’ names against the UK Sanctions List, but the use of such third-party providers does not extinguish liability. OFSI understands the necessity of using such systems when dealing with such high volumes of transactions, but if used they need to be effective – for example, as explained in the Bank of Scotland notice, they should recognise alternative name spellings which do not exactly match what is on the UK Sanctions List. OFSI notes that
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UK sanctions regulator targets financial services firms in enforcement push
The Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) has issued a number of enforcement actions against financial services firms recently: this sector is clearly a key focus for the UK’s financial sanctions enforcement agency. In August, the authority imposed its highest fine since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine against Citibank, N.A., London Branch (Citi London).1 The fine totalled almost £5 million, making it OFSI’s second-largest (the biggest having been imposed in 2020 against another financial institution, Standard Chartered Bank, for £20.47 million for Russia-related breaches).2
KEY TAKEAWAYS
firms must be aware of, and account for, the limitations of [third-party screening tools], supplementing with their own processes where appropriate.6
In line with the 2025 AC Strategy, OFSI is taking steps to reform its enforcement process.10 New legislation will be put forward to increase the statutory penalty maximum for breaches of UK sanctions from the higher of £1 million or 50% of the value of the breach, to the higher of £2 million or 100% of the value of the breach.11 An increase in the maximum penalty could be very significant for financial institutions involved in a UK sanctions breach.
Additionally, under UK financial sanctions, an entity which is owned or controlled by a designated person is itself considered designated7 and this may not be picked up by all screening tools. The Citi London notice refers to incorrect determinations of ownership/control by designated entities, which led to failures to identify entities subject to UK sanctions; this was an aggravating factor in the penalty issued. Effective and timely escalation procedures, with governance oversight, are important for identifying issues. What is also clear is that the financial sector is exposed to high-value penalties. This is because the amount of a fine is based on the value of transactions, and financial services firms, in comparison to other sectors, are often involved in high-value transactions and, as such, face much larger penalties. The Vanquis notice is unusual in that no monetary penalty was given because of the low value of the transactions, but OFSI still considered the breach to be “moderately severe” given that the relevant designated customer was able to access their account for eight days following their designation.
Financial sector participants should see these penalty notices as learning opportunities; due consideration must be given to the inherent risks identified, particularly now that OFSI is looking at the financial services sector with greater expectations.
UK sanctions regulator targets financial services firms in enforcement push HM Treasury. (2026, August 31). UK leads way in disrupting shadowy Russian sanctions evasion network. HM Treasury. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-leads-way-in-disrupting-shadowy-russian-sanctions-evasion-network OFSI. (2020, February 18). Monetary penalty report: Standard Chartered Bank. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5e831347e90e0706facc49e7/200331_-_SCB_Penalty_Report.pdf OFSI. (2025, September 8). Disclosure notice: VBL. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68beb534de0987fe84e0dd0f/VBL_Disclosure_Notice_08SEPT2025.pdf OFSI. (2025, October). OFSI Annual Review 2024-25. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68ef7ec68427701993d5e0d9/OFSI_Annual_Review_2024-25.pdf OFSI. (2026, January). Consultation response: Reform of OFSI’s enforcement process. HM Treasury. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/697b5944f8f4a746d9572f12/Consultation_Response.pdf OFSI. (2026, May 19). Monetary penalty notice: Deutsche Bank AG. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6a0c287bfcae986635db916d/DB_Penalty_Notice.pdf OFSI. (2026, September 2). Monetary penalty notice: Citibank N.A. London Branch. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6a97e3ba5a0c25165ae46760/CBNA_London_Public_Penalty_Notice.pdf OFSI. (2026, January 26). Penalty publication notice: Bank of Scotland PLC. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/697741f167ae94b3280137ee/Penalty_Publication_Notice_LBG_2026.pdf HM Government. (2026, January 5). UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025. HM Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-strategy-2025/uk-anti-corruption-strategy-2025-accessible OFSI. Financial sanctions enforcement and monetary penalties guidance. Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation. SEC. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/financial-sanctions-enforcement-and-monetary-penalties-guidance/financial-sanctions-enforcement-and-monetary-penalties-guidance UK Government. (2019, April 24). The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/855). UK Legislation. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/855/contents/made [12] The OFSI Consultation Response sets out that the settlement scheme will give subjects the option to settle enforcement cases to decrease the burden for OFSI and industry and the early account scheme will allow subjects of an investigation in some cases to provide OFSI with a comprehensive account as early as possible.
Footnotes Monetary penalty notice: Citibank N.A. London Branch. Monetary penalty report: Standard Chartered Bank. Disclosure notice: VBL. Penalty publication notice: Bank of Scotland PLC. Monetary penalty notice: Deutsche Bank AG. Monetary penalty notice: Deutsche Bank AG, para. 26. Regulation 7 of The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/855). OFSI Annual Review 2024–25. UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025. Consultation response: Reform of OFSI's enforcement process. Consultation response: Reform of OFSI's enforcement process; HM Treasury, UK leads way in disrupting shadowy Russian sanctions evasion network. Consultation response: Reform of OFSI's enforcement process.
Given your extensive experience in different jurisdictions (US, UK, EU) from several perspectives and positions, what is your assessment of the main regulatory approaches in these jurisdictions, and of how they have developed over the past few years?
It is fair to say that the sanctions regulatory environment is becoming increasingly complex over time. The reason is that different regulatory regimes are heading toward conflict with one another: some already conflict, and the geopolitical trend points far more in that direction than toward any kind of convergence or coherence. We’re calling this the “balkanization” of sanctions regimes. The US, the EU and the UK used to be on the same page when it came to sanctions priorities. The days when one could count on those three regimes being close to identical are over. The US is pursuing its own set of national security priorities, and the UK and the EU theirs. The most glaring example of this is, and will be, in our view, the Russia sanctions regime. On top of that, new regimes are conflicting openly with the Western sanctions framework, foremost among them China’s and, to a less impactful extent, Russia’s. China’s anti-sanctions regime is a particularly significant development, because it places companies squarely in the middle of a conflict-of-laws situation.
This is the underlying trend, and such situations will only multiply. The days of a single compliance lens are over: each regime now has to be tracked separately and companies will need to parse the precise jurisdictional parameters of each transaction with great care.
With limited resources, the starting point is the “risk-based” approach: directing scarce resources to the areas of greatest risk. There are no hard metrics, but my experience shows that, as a rule, around 20% of the counterparties in an enterprise generate most of the risk, while the remaining 80% are lower-risk. The ratio varies from one company to another, but resources should be concentrated on those highest-risk third parties.
Jeffrey W. Cottle Partner, Washington
rom diverging sanctions regimes to internal investigations, from third-party due diligence to the decision to self-report, managing compliance risk today is at once an operational, regulatory and geopolitical challenge. Where should teams draw the
line on due diligence? How do you keep a compliance program credible with the business rather than merely cosmetic? When should a company self-report to a regulator, and when should it hold back?
F
From third-party due diligence to the decision to self-report
Sanctions and compliance:
These areas of due diligence are too often overlooked: too many companies understandably pour all their effort into initial onboarding of vendors, counterparties and agents, then run out of resources for the ongoing monitoring of business operations, sales volumes and revenue, which are essential to preventing diversion.
You ran compliance from inside major corporations before advising on it as a lawyer. Drawing on both perspectives, in your opinion, what distinguishes a compliance program that genuinely holds up (one that actually carries weight with senior management and the board) from a cosmetic one, and where do you see teams spending too much energy for too little effect?
My perspective as a former compliance officer is that it is necessary to earn credibility with the business, and the surest way to destroy that credibility is to spend resources on trivial things. There is little need, for instance, to run due diligence on certain low-risk vendors, as it usually adds nothing to prevention, but takes up valuable resources.
Protecting the time of internal clients and business teams is essential, and so is communicating to them the risks that genuinely matter in high-risk jurisdictions. The relationship with the business needs to remain constructive at all times: as an in-house compliance counsel, much of the job, in the end, is educating internal clients about the risks they actually face, and giving them the room to operate in lower-risk jurisdictions without wasting their time.
When a serious red flag surfaces, an organisation is torn between moving fast (preserving evidence, scoping the matter, deciding who to involve) and not rushing into anything that could compromise what follows (tipping off a subject, undermining a possible disclosure). What is really at stake in those first hours and days, and which early missteps do you most often see weigh on the rest of an investigation?
As a retired military officer, one of the first things I learned was the value of not panicking. All too often, a compliance incident triggers a great deal of panic, and panic leads to mistakes. In the first hour of a crisis, the single most important thing is to stay calm, to sit down and gather the facts before any announcement is made and before any investigative step is taken, so companies should approach the situation with a cool head, as it can become complex and contentious.
The challenge with a “risk-based” approach is that each company has to weigh how much risk it is prepared to accept, and allocate its resources accordingly. In practice, that means concentrating due diligence where the exposure genuinely lies (e.g., China, the countries bordering Russia, the Middle East, Africa) rather than spending it on counterparties in low-risk regions such as Western Europe or the Nordics, where it adds little.
Jeffrey Cottle shares his analysis and experience from both sides: in-house and as outside counsel.
Third-party due diligence is a constant point of friction: too light, it misses the risk; too heavy, it stalls the business, and the hardest part is often tracing who ultimately owns and controls a counterparty. Where is it wise to draw the line, and how do you keep ongoing monitoring genuinely useful rather than a box-ticking review?
Too many companies understandably pour all their effort into initial onboarding of vendors, counterparties and agents, then run out of resources for the ongoing monitoring of business operations, sales volumes and revenue, which are essential to preventing diversion.
Nothing erodes a compliance function’s credibility faster than spending resources on trivial things.
There is an almost automatic reflex in the C-suite to put out a public statement. That is the worst thing to do.
Often times, in companies facing serious compliance issues, there is an almost automatic reflex in the C-suite to put out a public statement (usually denying any allegations). That is the worst thing to do, because the information released is often only partly correct: it is too early to communicate, and there is a real risk of publishing information that will be proven wrong six hours, six days or even six weeks later. In these types of situations, the advisable course of action is to gather the facts, analyse their content, but most importantly, to be very sure of them before considering issuing a public statement. It is worth noting, however, that in most situations a company will never have all the facts. That is precisely why it is best to wait and assess when it is wise to communicate. Not panicking is, in every situation, the most important posture in those first hours.
Self-reporting to a regulator is a weighty decision: it can earn a company a reduced penalty and some control over the timeline, but it also means opening a process it will no longer fully control. When should a company self-report and when should it hold back, and what ultimately tips the balance?
First and foremost, a company should not self-report potential violations of law, but rather known ones. Too often, companies are advised, usually by outside lawyers, to report something before they even know whether they have broken the law. That is an extraordinarily expensive hypothetical to put in front of a regulator, and the regulator will run with it. There is, unfortunately, a perverse incentive for outside counsel to encourage a client to self-report. A company should therefore self-report only where there are known violations of law.
If a regulator could find out anyway, self-reporting is no longer up for debate.
When weighing whether to report, a company should ask whether the regulator is likely to learn of the matter in any event. If there is any possibility, however remote, that it would come to light without a self-report, the company should go in and talk to the regulator. A common example is a transaction blocked by a bank for sanctions-related reasons: a blocked transaction usually will be reported to a regulator (that is simply how banks operate, i.e., filing a Suspicious Activity Report, or whatever the equivalent is in the jurisdiction). Where a company was involved in such a transaction, the sensible course is to assume the regulator will know about it.
In that case, the matter is not even up for debate: the company should self-report, because if it stays silent and the regulator investigates of its own accord, it will receive no credit for self-reporting. That, ultimately, is the whole point of coming forward. Where a company does self-report, the way regulators treat such disclosures is encouraging. Across the jurisdictions where I’ve made self-reports (in Europe, the US, the UK and even in Africa), companies invariably receive considerable credit for coming forward. Sometimes that credit is precisely quantifiable, as in the US. In other jurisdictions, it may not be, but it is real all the same. The guiding principle, in short, is to self-report only when necessary, but, when it is necessary, to do so without hesitation.
European compliance functions operate in an environment where US legislation and regulatory frameworks carry weight well beyond their own borders. If you had to single out the one issue that most deserves their attention over the next eighteen months, what would it be?
In the sanctions field, a company without a systematic approach to managing sanctions-diversion risk is already behind. A great deal of attention is now being directed at diversion – especially by US regulators – and that only makes sense: most of the primary targets of sanctions have already been designated. In the case of Russia, Iran and others, the principal targets have all been listed. What has followed, around the world, is significant growth in diversion-related activity.
A company without a systematic approach to sanctions diversion is already behind.
Regulators understand this perfectly well: they know goods are no longer being sold into Russia directly, but indirectly. Any company that does not yet have a program geared toward sanctions diversion should put one in place quickly.
Interview conducted by Paul Caillard, coordinator of the AEGE Law Club, and Victor Chaves de Oliveira, Editor-in-Chief of the Economic Intelligence Portal for the Law Club, under the supervision of Clarisse Senaya, Editorial Director of FCS Journal.
Because most sanctions regimes are strict liability offenses, the depth of due diligence is not really a free choice: a company is required to follow up on whatever red flags emerge in the ordinary course of business. For example, if a distributor in Kazakhstan has seen its sales rise by 3,000% since the invasion of Ukraine, with no plausible explanation other than possible diversion to Russia, the company must pursue the matter and get to the bottom of it. That means carrying out not only due diligence at the onboarding stage, but also ongoing monitoring of indicators such as sales volumes, distributor activity, shipping activity, etc. Many of these “clues” to diversion can be detected in data a company already holds, e.g., in its CRM systems in particular: as part of a robust, risk-based compliance program, that data needs to be mined.
The days of a single compliance lens are over: each regime now has to be tracked separately.
For multinational organisations, this creates a more complex risk environment, where conduct in one jurisdiction can quickly attract scrutiny elsewhere. Financial crime, sanctions, governance failures and emerging technologies are all contributing to greater enforcement exposure and increasing the need for globally coordinated compliance and risk management. Conduct that was once viewed primarily as a compliance or financial crime issue is now increasingly being assessed through a national security lens. This is particularly evident in areas such as sanctions, export controls, money laundering, transnational criminal networks and access to sensitive technologies. As a result, regulators are expecting organisations to demonstrate not only compliance with legal obligations, but also mature governance, robust risk management and effective oversight by boards and senior executives. The adequacy of an organisation’s compliance framework is now often as important as the underlying conduct itself. Against this backdrop, several key themes are shaping the global enforcement landscape.
Compliance requirements are extending beyond traditional financial institutions to gatekeeper professions and businesses, with regulators expecting more sophisticated compliance frameworks, enhanced due diligence and stronger ongoing monitoring. Financial crime is increasingly being addressed through coordinated cross-border enforcement efforts such as Operation Frontier+, requiring organisations to develop more coordinated and internationally focused approaches to AML compliance, customer due diligence and financial crime risk management.
The recent Singapore Nvidia-related investigation demonstrates how issues involving export controls, emerging technologies, AI-related infrastructure and fraud can rapidly attract multi-jurisdictional regulatory and enforcement scrutiny.
From risk to response:
Managing global enforcement exposure
Trade risk has become a mainstream white-collar crime issue
Anti-money laundering (AML) obligations continue to expand
Whistleblowers and organisational culture are becoming increasingly prominent features of the global enforcement landscape
Across jurisdictions, many significant investigations now originate from employee reports, internal complaints and other protected disclosures rather than regulator detection. Whistleblower activity is increasing, supported by enhanced protections and, in the United States, financial incentive programmes designed to encourage reporting. As regulators place greater emphasis on organisational culture and accountability, the effectiveness of a company’s whistleblower framework is increasingly viewed as an indicator of its broader governance environment. Equally important is the response once a concern is raised. Increasingly, organisations are being scrutinised not only for the alleged misconduct itself, but also for the timeliness, independence and effectiveness of their response, with poor whistleblower management carrying significant legal, regulatory and reputational consequences.
For board members and senior executives, the implications are clear. Organisations must look beyond compliance with individual laws and regulatory frameworks. Instead, they should focus on building governance, risk and compliance programmes that are agile, globally coordinated and capable of responding to an increasingly complex and rapidly evolving enforcement landscape. Those organisations that proactively identify and manage emerging risks will be better positioned to navigate heightened regulatory scrutiny and enforcement activity across multiple jurisdictions.
Singapore’s Anti-Scam Command provides an example of this approach. Edwin Tong SC, Singapore’s Minister for Law and Second Minister for Home Affairs, has highlighted how close operational cooperation between the police and financial institutions enables accounts to be frozen rapidly when suspected scam activity is identified, improving the prospects of asset recovery and reducing harm to victims. AI adoption also raises important ethical and governance considerations, including legal privilege, appropriate oversight and the standard of care expected when AI tools are deployed within legal and compliance functions. This is particularly relevant following the Heppner decision in the United States¹, where the court determined that AI-generated materials could not attract privilege because AI is not a person, the queries were not made confidentially to obtain legal advice, and the documents were created without the direction or supervision of legal counsel.
Allianz Commercial. (2024, n.d.). *The data center construction boom: Emerging risk trends in the global buildout.* Allianz. https://commercial.allianz.com/content/dam/onemarketing/commercial/commercial/reports/commercial-data-center-construction-risks.pdf Ronken, L. (2021, August). *Data centres – An underestimated risk?* Gen Re. https://www.genre.com/content/dam/generalreinsuranceprogram/documents/pmint21-2-en.pdf Integra, Integrated, Issue 17
Mikaela Eldridge Senior Associate, Singapore
hite-collar crime enforcement is becoming increasingly global, technology-enabled and focused
on corporate accountability. Regulators and law enforcement agencies across jurisdictions are strengthening cooperation, sharing information and taking a more coordinated approach to cross-border investigations and enforcement.
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Data Centres
Organisations are increasingly required to understand their supply chains, verify end-users, manage export control obligations and navigate complex sanctions regimes. Many multinational businesses are experiencing the practical challenge of complying with overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, legal requirements across jurisdictions.
Technology is playing an increasingly important role in the global enforcement landscape
While artificial intelligence (AI), data analytics and other digital tools are enhancing the detection, investigation and prosecution of misconduct in white-collar matters, they are also enabling criminal activity to occur with unprecedented speed and sophistication. Scammers and other criminal actors can move funds and assets across multiple jurisdictions within minutes, significantly reducing the window for intervention. As a result, there is growing emphasis on real-time collaboration between law enforcement agencies, regulators, financial institutions and other private sector stakeholders to identify suspicious activity and disrupt criminal conduct before assets disappear.
A further defining feature of the global enforcement landscape is the growing degree of international cooperation between regulators and law enforcement agencies. Data sharing, coordinated investigations and parallel enforcement actions are becoming increasingly common, requiring organisations to manage regulatory risk on a global rather than jurisdiction-specific basis. These developments closely reflect the findings of Clyde & Co’s Corporate Risk Radar report, which identifies regulatory enforcement, financial crime, geopolitical instability, technological disruption and governance failures as among the most significant risks facing organisations in today’s operating environment. These risks are becoming increasingly interconnected, with regulators taking a more coordinated and technology-enabled approach to enforcement and placing greater emphasis on organisational accountability.
From risk to response: Managing global enforcement exposure United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 2026, February 17). United States v. Heppner, No. 25 Cr. 503 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y.).
The US continues to operate the most far-reaching sanctions programme. The reach of US sanctions is amplified by the extraterritorial effect of certain sanctions regimes. In addition, non-US entities can be exposed to US sanctions by creating a US nexus, such as dollar transactions or US-linked activity, or through secondary sanctions. Combined with strict liability and active enforcement by US regulators, this creates a high-risk environment for multinational organisations, particularly those operating across complex supply chains or financial networks.
The UK and EU sanctions regimes continue to expand, particularly in response to recent geopolitical developments.
Financial sanctions, focused on asset freezes and restricting the making available of funds and economic resources to designated persons;
United States: Extraterritorial reach
Enforcement activity is increasing globally, with higher penalties, enhanced reporting obligations and a growing emphasis on transparency and early engagement with regulators. Jurisdictions such as the UK, Canada and Australia are strengthening their frameworks, while regulators are more frequently seeking to publicise enforcement outcomes. This not only increases legal exposure but also raises reputational risk for businesses.
Over the past 15 years, sanctions have expanded significantly in scale, scope and sophistication across major jurisdictions, including the US, UK and EU. These regimes typically combine asset freezes on individuals and companies with trade restrictions on the movement of certain goods and technologies to sanctioned territories. A key development has been the shift toward strict liability enforcement, meaning breaches can occur regardless of intent or awareness. At the same time, regulators are issuing frequent updates, new guidance and enhancing enforcement processes, creating a fast-moving and highly technical compliance environment. Sanctions are also inherently dynamic. Measures can be introduced, expanded or removed quickly in response to geopolitical developments, creating both risk and potential opportunity for international businesses.
Enforcement and compliance pressure
Sanctions
anctions have become a defining feature of the global risk landscape, driven by geopolitical instability and
increasingly used as a tool of foreign policy to apply economic pressure. In a recent webinar as part of our Insurance Emerging Risk webinar programme, contributors from across multiple jurisdictions explored how sanctions regimes are evolving and what this means for insurers operating in an increasingly complex and fragmented regulatory environment.
S
United Kingdom and European Union: Expansion and divergence
In the UK, sanctions are structured around:
Global trends, risks and implications for insurers
As geopolitical tensions continue to shape the regulatory environment, sanctions will remain a critical consideration and a defining feature of global risk for insurers writing international insurance or reinsurance. Sanctions now sit at the heart of insurance – from underwriting and policy drafting to claims, reinsurance, and global programmes. As regimes evolve and enforcement tightens, even established processes can quickly become exposed.
Neil Beresford Partner, London
REFRENCES
Enforcement has strengthened considerably, with increased penalties, greater use of civil enforcement powers and a shift toward strict liability. EU financial and trade sanctions are very similar to the UK. The EU has significantly expanded its sectoral and transaction restrictions targeting industries such as energy, finance and transportation. At the same time, divergence between the US, UK and EU sanctions regimes is becoming more pronounced, creating complexity and potential conflicts for multinational businesses navigating overlapping obligations.
Insurance Emerging Risk
Latest insurance news and opinions to help you navigate the unknown
A rapidly evolving global framework
Implement robust business continuity and disaster recovery measures – traditional measures include, for example, establishing mirror servers and a combination of online, nearline and offline back-up data storage facilities to minimise service downtime and ensure that secure data access can continue uninterrupted in the event of a data deletion or corruption incident.
Trade sanctions, targeting the movement of goods and technologies and the provision of associated services which can include (re)insurance.
This fragmentation increases legal uncertainty and requires businesses to adopt more sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional compliance strategies.
Sanctions risk arises throughout the insurance lifecycle but is most acute in four areas:
Limited visibility of counterparties and beneficial ownership; Fragmented systems and incomplete data; Misunderstandings arising from the contours of a difficult and complex sanctions environment.
Insurance sector: Key risk areas
In practice, sanctions are still often treated as a one-off onboarding exercise, when they require continuous, active oversight.
Sanctions are no longer globally aligned. In regions such as Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, many jurisdictions maintain more limited domestic regimes, often focused on UN measures, but companies in those regions remain exposed to international sanctions through cross-border activity. Some of the key risks to navigate include:
Exposure to US secondary sanctions; Introduction of China’s anti-foreign sanctions law, creating competing legal obligations; Russian countermeasures, leading to parallel proceedings and conflicting judgments.
Global divergence and countermeasures
Issues typically arise not from deliberate misconduct but from:
From compliance to strategic risk
Sanctions compliance continues to be a significant risk area for senior management at insurers, extending beyond the compliance function into operational risk and strategic decision-making.
Underwriting and placement: Risks may arise through insureds’ operations, counterparties or supply chains, including where the provision of (re)insurance is connected with restricted goods and technologies, sanctioned jurisdictions and/or designated companies/individuals. Claims handling: A high-risk stage, where payments may constitute making funds or economic resources available to a designated person, directly or indirectly. Ongoing policy management: Sanctions risk evolves over time. Designations and new trade restrictions can occur mid-policy, requiring continuous screening and monitoring. Reinsurance and third-party relationships: Cross-border arrangements and reliance on intermediaries increase indirect exposure and complexity.
Addressing these challenges requires integrated governance, robust due diligence and clear escalation frameworks.
Sanctions are becoming more complex, more dynamic and more central to transacting international business.
A global shift: Risk and opportunity
Our globally recognised team helps insurers navigate overlapping, fast-moving regulations, assess cross-border exposure, and respond to emerging risks in real time. We combine deep sector expertise with international reach to advise on the practical impact of sanctions across trade, shipping, and global risk transfer. From underwriting guidelines to sensitive claims and cross-border portfolios, we deliver clear, commercially focused solutions that protect your business and support confident decision-making.
For insurers, this creates both risk and opportunity:
The need for enhanced due diligence and monitoring; Sanctions awareness in underwriting and claims processes; Increased importance of multi-jurisdictional compliance expertise.
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Wietske Felmore Senior Associate, Toronto
Chris Hill Partner, London
Douglas Maag Senior Counsel, New York
Ivan Urzhumov Partner, Paris
Sanctions:
In this latest development, however, it is worth noting that the claims filed by multiple state attorneys general were directed solely at Meta, alleging that it falsely represents its platforms as safe for children and misrepresents the prevalence of harmful content. Additionally, Meta is accused of violating the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 1998 (COPPA) by collecting personal information from children under 13 without parental consent. Plaintiffs argue that this issue is exacerbated by the company’s allegedly ineffective age-gating protocols. The plaintiffs also contend that the addictive design features of these platforms, particularly those targeting young users, such as infinite scroll and autoplay, cause serious harm by promoting addictive use. They allege that mental health issues, including anxiety, depression, self-harm, and eating disorders, are linked to children’s use of Meta’s platforms. The plaintiffs also allege that Meta’s design choices have contributed to a children’s mental health crisis.
coalition of over 40 US state attorneys general and Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”) have reached a proposed
settlement of up to $17.1 billion, resolving allegations that Meta misled consumers regarding the risks of its platforms to minors and unlawfully collected data from children under 13. This reflects the first comprehensive governmental settlement reached in the federal Multi-District Litigation (MDL), which has been proceeding in the Northern District of California against various defendants, including Instagram LLC, Snap, Inc., TikTok, Inc., ByteDance, Inc., YouTube LLC, Google LLC, and Alphabet Inc.
A
The consent judgment filed on Wednesday 26 August 2026 advises that the settlement agreement reached focuses on state attorneys general consumer protection and COPPA claims against Meta, and creates potentially significant payment obligations on Meta, with $11.66 billion to be paid across participating states, as well as potential contingency payments of $5.02 billion and $75 million toward state litigation and investigation costs. Amongst other relief, the settlement also imposes extensive injunctive requirements governing Meta’s products, age verification practices, parental controls, content moderation, and teen usage restrictions. For example, Meta will be required to deploy age-assurance technology across its platforms, restrict nighttime platform access for teenagers, and enhance protections against interactions with adults. The platforms also will be subject to extensive compliance and monitoring protocols, including regular audits.
Meta’s multi-state social media addiction settlement
Commenced in October 2022, the MDL has grown to encompass hundreds of actions brought by personal injury plaintiffs, school districts, local government entities, and state attorneys general, all addressing the allegedly addictive designs of social media. These actions allege that the defendants (including Meta) failed to warn underage users and their parents about the risks of addiction and the potential for several injuries, including suicidal ideation, self-harm, eating disorders, anxiety, and depression. This conduct is claimed to result in various emotional and physical harms, including death. Earlier in the year, we considered the MDL and related claims in relation to social media addiction in this article.
Rosehana Amin Partner, London
Tim Atwood Associate, London
The $17.1 billion settlement
The MDL will continue with the non-participating government entities, as well as the claims filed by school districts, counties, and personal injury claims filed on behalf of children (and the representatives of their estates, in cases of death) who are alleged to have suffered personal injuries as a result of defendants’ products. In addition, the settlement does not resolve claims pending in California state court under the Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding (JCCP) in Los Angeles Superior Court.
The status of the MDL and related proceedings
Following the announcement of the settlement, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in the UK released a statement on 27 August 2026 noting that (i) the UK continues to develop plans for a social media ban for under 16s, (ii) children’s privacy is a regulatory priority, and (iii) they will continue their ongoing work examining how social media and video-sharing platforms use children’s personal information. Interestingly, the ICO concluded its statement saying that they “are contacting Meta following the outcome of this case”.
A UK regulatory perspective
Overall, the settlement represents one of the most substantial resolutions involving social media platforms, youth safety and addiction allegations, while leaving coverage issues concerning settlement payments, defence costs, and compliance-related expenditures to be addressed under applicable policy language. In that regard, the settlement expressly states that it is not an admission of liability, wrongdoing, or legal violation, and provides that Meta may introduce this in litigation concerning “Defendant’s right to coverage under an insurance contract”. With the size of the settlement and Meta’s express preservation of insurance-coverage issues, it is highly likely this will become a significant case study for the insurance market for general liability insurers, and other lines of business. The ICO’s statement also suggests that social media companies and video-sharing platforms may not only face scrutiny from individual plaintiffs, school districts or US state attorneys general, but also from data protection regulators outside the US.
Wider insurance implications
Poppy Hitchen Senior Associate, New York
Adam Leese Associate, London
Kirsten Soto Senior Counsel, Los Angeles
Content is correct at the time of publication, 27 August 2026.
This is a relatively technical amendment but could have meaningful practical benefits. It should simplify authorisation processes, reduce compliance costs and remove uncertainty around the scope of permissions required by fund managers operating within delegated structures. Importantly, the proposal may not extend to all business models. Firms managing separately managed accounts (SMAs) may still need to consider whether additional permissions remain necessary.
CP 173 also seeks to simplify the licensing framework for fund managers. Under the proposal, activities such as Dealing in Investments as Agent and Arranging Deals in Investments would be treated as integral components of fund management when carried out pursuant to delegated fund mandates. As a result:
On 7 July 2026, DFSA published Consultation Paper No. 173 (CP 173), proposing a comprehensive modernisation of the DIFC’s Collective Investment Funds framework. The consultation represents the most significant review of the regime since its introduction in 2006 and subsequent reforms in 2010. It reflects the considerable growth and increasing sophistication of the DIFC’s asset management sector, as well as evolving international regulatory standards and the DFSA’s supervisory experience.
DFSA Consultation Paper No. 173
Key proposals include:
Overhaul of the DIFC Collective Investment Funds framework
These changes appear intended to make the DIFC regime more consistent with international fund structuring practices and could increase the attractiveness of DIFC-based Public Funds for both regional and international managers.
Nadine Danzey Trainee Solicitor, Dubai
A recurring theme throughout CP 173 is the DFSA’s intention to regulate according to risk rather than fund label. The DFSA recognises that many existing requirements were designed for a market that looked very different two decades ago. As fund structures have become increasingly sophisticated, rigid classifications and specialist fund rules can create regulatory friction without necessarily improving investor outcomes. The proposals therefore seek to provide greater flexibility for professional investor funds while preserving more extensive protections for Public Funds that may be accessible to retail investors. This approach aligns with broader international trends, where regulators are increasingly focusing on governance, transparency and risk management outcomes rather than highly prescriptive product-specific rules.
One of the most significant reforms is the proposed scaling back of specialist fund classifications and associated requirements for Qualifying Investor Funds and Exempt Funds.
The practical effect is that managers will have greater freedom to structure funds according to investment objectives rather than regulatory classifications. For alternative asset managers in particular, the changes should reduce complexity for multi-strategy vehicles and make the DIFC framework more accommodating to market developments that have emerged since the original rules were introduced.
A shift towards proportionate regulation
1. Greater flexibility for private funds
Expanding the definition of “Master Fund” to permit direct investment by institutional and professional investors alongside feeder funds; Removing legacy eligibility requirements that have limited the practical use of feeder structures, including: The requirement for regular offerings by at least three market makers; The 20% cap on a feeder fund’s participation in a master fund.
Providing greater flexibility for hybrid debt and equity strategies.
Public Funds, however, would continue to be subject to more detailed specialist requirements given their retail investor exposure.
2. Streamlined licensing for investment managers
A single Managing Assets licence would generally be sufficient for delegated fund management activities; Managers would no longer need to obtain multiple licences to perform functions that are ancillary to portfolio management.
One of the more consequential proposals is the abolition of the external fund manager (EFM) regime. The EFM framework currently allows certain non-DIFC managers to manage domestic DIFC funds without obtaining full DFSA authorisation. The DFSA proposes removing this route entirely. In practice, this reflects a broader policy preference for firms managing DIFC funds to maintain a meaningful presence within the DIFC and operate under full DFSA supervision. While this change may increase regulatory obligations for certain existing managers, it also aligns with wider international regulatory expectations regarding substance, accountability and supervisory oversight. Managers currently relying on the EFM framework should begin assessing the potential operational and licensing implications at an early stage.
4. Removal of the external fund manager regime
Removing or reducing a number of specialist fund requirements that currently apply regardless of a fund’s actual risk profile. Eliminating dedicated money market fund and private equity fund rules for Exempt Funds.
The DFSA is also proposing a number of changes aimed at modernising master–feeder arrangements for Public Funds. The proposals include:
3. Modernising master–feeder structures
CP 173 also seeks feedback on a number of emerging areas that may shape future reform. These include:
Looking ahead: Tokenisation and long-term investment funds
The DFSA is similarly proposing to expand sponsor investment exemptions, including in relation to venture capital fund structures. These changes recognise that employee participation and sponsor co-investment are common features of private fund structures internationally and can help align the interests of managers, sponsors and investors.
The tokenisation of fund units and fund assets, including tokenised money market funds; The potential introduction of a Long-Term Investment Fund (LTIF) regime to facilitate retail access to certain illiquid real-economy assets.
The consultation also proposes more flexible arrangements for employee and sponsor participation in private funds. The changes would:
Enable certain employees involved in investment management or advisory functions to invest in funds managed by their employer;
5. Expanded co-investment opportunities
Several proposals may also warrant further industry feedback, particularly around valuation independence requirements, the scope of employee investment relief and the operation of sponsor investment exemptions.
Potential benefits include:
At the same time, firms should assess the impact of the proposed reforms on:
Greater flexibility for private and alternative investment funds; Reduced regulatory complexity for multi-strategy structures; Streamlined licensing requirements; Modernised master–feeder arrangements; Enhanced employee and sponsor participation mechanisms.
Key takeaways for fund managers
For most fund sponsors and managers, the consultation is likely to be viewed as a positive development.
Existing fund structures; Governance and valuation frameworks; Borrowing and leverage disclosures; Employee investment arrangements; Any reliance on the external fund manager regime.
While these proposals remain at an early stage, they provide a useful indication of the DFSA’s longer-term policy priorities and its willingness to explore innovative investment structures within an appropriately regulated environment.
Next steps
Conclusion The consultation period for CP 173 closed on 7 September 2026. At the time of republication, the DFSA had not issued a feedback statement or final rules, and the proposals remain subject to DFSA review, Board approval and, where relevant, DIFC Presidential and Ruler’s assent. CP 173 represents a significant evolution of the DIFC funds framework. Rather than introducing wholesale new obligations, the proposals seek to recalibrate the regime to better reflect the risks associated with different fund structures and investor types.
Tom Bicknell Partner, Dubai
Barkha Doshi Legal Director, Dubai
At its core, CP 173 seeks to move the regime towards a more risk-based and proportionate model, particularly for funds marketed to professional investors. The proposed reforms would reduce prescriptive requirements where investor protection concerns are lower, while maintaining safeguards in areas the DFSA considers to present material risks.
Permit participation directly or through dedicated investment vehicles;
Disapply certain minimum subscription requirements;
Relax aspects of the client classification framework for eligible participants.
Relaxing certain restrictions applicable to credit funds, including: Lifting prohibitions on cross-border trade finance activities; Removing certain related-party lending restrictions; Facilitating financing strategies such as NAV lending, subject to appropriate safeguards.
The consultation is open until 7 September 2026, with the DFSA proposing a three-month implementation period following finalisation of the reforms. Given the breadth of the proposed changes, firms should consider conducting an early impact assessment and, where appropriate, engaging with the consultation process.
If implemented substantially in their current form, the proposals should further enhance the DIFC’s attractiveness as a regional fund domicile while maintaining the regulatory standards expected of a leading international financial centre.
This leaves many questions for compliance teams to ponder. Assuming that it is clear what the organisation’s “activities” are, what does it mean to have a “significant” role in making decisions about them? What comprises a “substantial” part of those activities and what does it mean to play a substantial part in organising/managing that? What conduct could potentially create criminal offences during such activity, mindful of offences relating not only to bribery and corruption laws but also to data protection, sanctions, human rights, environmental and indeed all other legislation? Who within the organisation is authorised to do such things, and how much does that even matter, if the key question turns out to be not whether those staff had such authority – but whether other people thought that they did? This gives rise to complex and detailed decisions to be factored into risk assessments in a way that hasn’t yet been tested.
There are many unknowns posed by the CPA, but what is clear is that it requires compliance teams to consider a new question: who are our functional senior managers as defined in the CPA, and what activities might they appear, to those outside our organisation, to be authorised to do, even if only in part? We have already seen prosecutors and the courts grapple with the concept of the directing mind and will of the company, with cases such as The SFO vs Barclays PLC [2018] EWHC 3055 (QB) underlining the importance of forensically assessing the level of authority and discretion required to result in corporate attribution. The CPA now creates a further question: who is a senior manager? Assessing the activity of managers, including “shadow senior managers”, may turn out to be the biggest challenge compliance teams have seen in recent years, and only time will tell if the senior manager test proves to be more straightforward than its directing mind and will predecessor.
In the past, corporate criminal liability required the offender to be the “directing mind and will” of the corporate, such as a C-suite individual. This was in practice a difficult test for prosecutors to satisfy, particularly in organisations where the making of routine decisions sits below C-suite level. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA) sought to move away from that problem by making organisations potentially liable for certain economic crimes, such as fraud and money laundering, committed by their senior managers (s.196-8).
Shadow senior managers and apparent authority
On 29 June 2026, s.250 of the UK’s Crime and Policing Act (CPA) came into force, and going forward, corporates and partnerships may find themselves liable for any offences committed by senior managers who were acting within the actual (or apparent) scope of their authority.
The new challenge for compliance teams
Anousheh Bromfield Partner, London
CPA s.250 provides that:
No defence is given: no matter how impressive the organisation’s procedures may be, corporate liability can nonetheless arise under CPA s.250.
Organisations may also need to consider if they are insured for the costs of defending allegations that the organisation has attracted liability under s.250 CPA, and if that insurance captures the new functional definition of senior manager, or is limited to acts authorised by directors and officers. Already organisations are discovering the cost in both time and money of responding to allegations which are low in merit but high in volume and frequency, as those of a vexatious nature experiment with the capabilities of AI to generate compliance complaints.
if a senior manager of an organisation, acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority, commits any offence, the organisation also commits the offence, save that
ECCTA s.196-8 is omitted by CPA s.250. So, who is a senior manager acting within the scope of their actual or apparent authority, and what might they do? As to the former, the CPA is clear that the definition is functional, irrespective of job title. In the CPA, a senior manager is someone who plays a significant role in making decisions about how the whole (or a substantial part) of the organisation’s activities are to be managed/organised, or who wholly or substantially manages/organises such activities.
Equally, insurers will also need to consider how, to whom and to what extent they provide cover for such defence costs and how s.250 CPA affects their own risk assessments both internally and in terms of coverage options.
On 29 June 2026, the UK travelled much further down the path of attributed corporate liability. Organisations are now potentially liable for all criminal offences, not only economic crimes.
an organisation does not commit that offence if:
– all of the offence occurs outside the UK, and – the organisation would not commit the offence if that conduct were the organisation’s.